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Abstract 
Past research has suggested that social engineering poses the most significant security risk. 
Recent studies have suggested that social networking sites (SNSs) are the most common 
source of social engineering attacks. The risk of social engineering attacks in SNSs is 
associated with the difficulty of making accurate judgments regarding source credibility in 
the virtual environment of SNSs. In this paper, we quantitatively investigate source credibility 
dimensions in terms of social engineering on Facebook, as well as the source characteristics 
that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible, therefore making them 
susceptible to victimization. Moreover, in order to predict users’ susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization based on their demographics, we investigate the effectiveness of 
source characteristics on different demographic groups by measuring the consent intentions 
and behavior responses of users to social engineering requests using a role-play experiment. 
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Introduction 
Security threats in information systems generally come through the vulnerabilities of technologies or the 
vulnerabilities of people. People are considered the weakest link in security (Nohlberg 2009; West et al. 
2009). Social engineering is the art of deceiving or tricking people in order to gain information from 
them, or to persuade them to perform an action that will benefit the attacker in some way (Hadnagy 2010; 
Thornburgh 2004; Workman 2007). Many organizations recognize the importance of predicting and 
controlling social engineering, but many fail to reach that goal (Brody 2012). Recently, fraudulent and 
deceptive people have been using social engineering traps and tactics by using social networking sites to 
trick victims into obeying them, accepting threats, and falling victim to various crimes and attacks such as 
phishing, sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, impersonation, physical crime, and many other 
forms of attack. The simple trick of offering free cell phone minutes, accounted for the largest number of 
attacks on Facebook users in 2013, increasing from 56% in 2012 to 81% in 2013 (Toops 2014). Recent 
research on SNSs security showed that most social engineering threats, such as spamming, identity 
cloning, and social bots, rely mainly on fake identities (Fire et al. 2014). This provides an explanation for 
why around 83 million (8.7% of all accounts) Facebook accounts are estimated to be fake (Couper 2013). 
Several researchers have investigated and highlighted the risks associated with social engineering in SNSs 
(e.g., (Nagy and Pecho 2009; Jagatic et al. 2007; Dimensional-Research 2011; Chitrey et al. 2012; Algarni 
et al. 2013a; Algarni et al. 2013b; Braun and Esswein 2013)). These studies have suggested that SNSs are 
the most common source of social engineering threats nowadays. 
The risk of social engineering attacks in SNSs is associated with how difficult it is for users to make 
accurate judgments regarding deception in the virtual environment of SNSs. In our previous work, 
(Algarni et al. 2014a), and (Algarni et al. 2014b), we investigated how people perceive and make 
judgments about the credibility of attackers in Facebook, which is the key element in a user’s decision to 
accept or reject social engineering attacks. Using a qualitative grounded theory method, we explored 
source credibility dimensions in terms of social engineering on Facebook, as well as the source 
characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible and therefore make them 
susceptible to becoming a victim. In this paper, we aim to test the findings of our previous work 
quantitatively using a role-play experimental method, and to examine to what extent those factors, which 
were explored in the previous work, affect user victimization. Moreover, in order to predict users’ 
susceptibility to social engineering victimization based on their characteristics, we want to investigate 
whether there is any relationship between the effectiveness of those factors that influence Facebook users 
to judge an attacker as credible and users’ demographics. This type of mixed methods design, which starts 
with a qualitative method followed by a quantitative method, is known as the sequential exploratory 
mixed method (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). 
Literature Review and Theoretical Development 
Susceptibility to Social Engineering 
Several studies in information systems have investigated individuals’ susceptibility to security 
victimization by studying employees’ compliance with organizations’ security policies. This has been done 
by relying on a number of theories and techniques, such as protection motivation theory (e.g., (Posey et al. 
2013; Posey et al. 2014; Johnston et al. 2015)), electroencephalography (Vance et al. 2014), technology 
threat avoidance theory (Herath et al. 2014), and routine activity theory (Wang et al. 2015). There seems 
to be a general agreement that an individual’s compliance with information security policies is associated 
with making accurate judgments regarding threat. Most of the research that has investigated human 
behaviors with regard to social engineering threat has been done on phishing e-mail, which is a type of 
social engineering attack but in a different context than SNSs. In those studies, the effectiveness of (false) 
source credibility has been repeatedly demonstrated in phishing victimization (e.g., (Dhamija et al. 2006; 
Luo et al. 2012; Sussman; Siegal 2003)). Moreover, there are only a few e-mail phishing studies (e.g., 
(Workman 2008; Parrish Jr et al. 2009; Kumaraguru et al. 2009; Kvedar et al. 2010; Sheng et al. 2010; 
Pattinson et al. 2012; Wright et al. 2014)) that have measured susceptibility to specific types of e-mail 
phishing attacks, or have studied the effectiveness of one or more phishing countermeasures in relation to 
some demographic factors. The difference between our study and those studies is that our focus is on 
social engineering in Facebook, and not in e-mail. Social engineering in Facebook involves several other 
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techniques, such as posts, tags, applications, games, impersonation using fake profiles, and even 
interactive persuasion using chatting or messaging. Moreover, the focus of our study is on investigating 
how people judge attackers, and which source characteristics they base these judgments on, which have 
not been explored even in e-mail phishing studies. Recently, deception in SNSs have attracted many 
researchers. For example, there are several studies that have made contributions in regard to classifying 
the identity, mostly the gender, of the profiles’ owners, (e.g., (Al Zamal et al. 2012; Liu and Ruths 2013; 
Rao et al. 2010; Pennacchiotti and Popescu 2011; Mislove et al. 2011; Alowibdi et al. 2014)). These studies 
generally used text-based characteristics as well as a set of features extracted from the accounts for 
classifying the users based on the profiles’ content. Moreover, there are some studies that focused on 
detecting spamming in SNSs (e.g., (Chu et al. 2012; Huber et al. 2009; Thomas et al. 2013; Stringhini et 
al. 2010; Wang 2010; McCord and Chuah 2011; Castillo et al. 2011)), which used also profiles’ content to 
detect if the account was automated or human. However, social engineers are usually human. Therefore, 
the benefits of the findings from previous studies remain limited in terms of social engineering.  
Source Credibility  
A social engineering attack always comes as a message containing a request. This request can be direct, or 
it can be a trick that requires the victim to accept or respond to a request. In SNSs, obeying and accepting 
a message involves complying with a request, such as a request to click a link and the user clicks it, or a 
request to accept an offer and the user chooses to accept it. According to source credibility theory, people 
are more likely to obey and accept a message when the source presents itself as credible (Hovland et al. 
1953). The theory is broken into the following three models: the factor, the functional, and the 
constructivist model. The aim of these models is to narrow the wide scope of the theory. That is, the factor 
model helps determine to what extent the receiver judges the source as credible. The functional model 
views credibility as the degree to which a source meets a receiver's needs. The constructivist model shows 
what the receiver does with the persuader’s proposal or message. Source credibility research has its roots 
in persuasion. Aristotle divided the aspects of persuasion into three categories: ethos (credibility), pathos 
(emotion) and logos (logic). As emotion and logic indicate a person’s emotional connection and means of 
reasoning to convince one of a particular argument, credibility refers to people believing who they trust 
(Burke 1966). For decades, marketers, advertisers, politicians, and researchers in human communication 
have investigated the effects of source characteristics on the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors of the audience 
with regard to the contents of a message. A highly credible source is commonly found to be more 
persuasive than a low-credibility one (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Johnson and Izzett 1969; Kelman and 
Hovland 1953; Klebba and Unger 1983; Koslin et al. 1967; Pornpitakpan 2004).  
Because of the many different operationalizations that appear in the literature, many definitions have 
been presented for source credibility. Due to the purpose of this research, which is exploring the source 
characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible, we have adapted the 
definition of Ohanian 1990, where he defined source credibility as “a term commonly used to imply a 
communicator's positive characteristics that affect the receiver's acceptance of a message” (Ohanian 
1990). Credibility is considered a perception (Tseng and Fogg 1999). It is a complex concept that is 
composed of other concepts called dimensions. In fact, many things can impact the perceived credibility 
of a source, depending on the type of that source, and the characteristics of the medium, channel, or 
environment (Metzger et al. 2003). Therefore, several dimensions of source credibility have been 
proposed such as intimacy, character, esteem, sociability, and clarity, depending on the type of the source 
and the type of the contexts (e.g., (Berlo et al. 1969; Markham 1968; Salwen 1987; Mosier and Ahlgren 
1981; Corina 2006; Singletary 1976)). By looking at social engineering attacker, we can see that the type of 
the source is different and the type of context (Facebook) is also diffetrent than those studied before 
(Kane et al. 2014). Therefore, it was essential that, if we wish to study the credibility of a social 
engineering attacker in SNSs, a specific investigation has to be conducted specifically for that purpose. 
Conceptualization 
The a priori model and research hypotheses have been explored and developed in our previous works 
(Algarni et al. 2014a), and (Algarni et al. 2014b). This section will present an overall summary of the 
theoretical development and conceptualization. Source credibility theory, which was explained in the 
previous section, is the overarching theoretical framing of this study. While validating or violating source 
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credibility dimensions in terms of social engineering on Facebook is a substantial contribution, our aim is 
not limited to this end. That is, we also want to link these dimensions to Facebook-based characteristics. 
Because no existing theory or model that can be applied to address the aim of the research, Creswell 
(2012) suggested using the grounded theory method to inductively build the targeted model.  
Grounded theory is a good design to use when a theory is not available to explain the process. The literature 
may have models available, but they were developed and tested on samples and populations other than those 
of interest to the qualitative researcher. (Creswell 2012, p66). 
Grounded theory is a research method that seeks to develop a theory inductively that is grounded in data 
(Myers 1997). There has been increasing interest in the use of grounded theory in information systems 
research, due to its usefulness in developing theories within different and new contexts (Urquhart et al. 
2010). The challenge of this topic is that the participants might claim that they are aware of deceptive 
practices and cannot be deceived. At best, they would admit that they do not know how they have been 
deceived. For this kind of challenge, Flick (2004) suggested using triangulation, which refers to the use of 
more than one method to investigate a research question. In our previous works, we used between-
method triangulation, including observation and interviews (24 participants), and an open-ended 
questionnaire (72 participants), to explore the dimensions of source credibility in terms of social 
engineering attacks on Facebook.  As represented in Figure 1, four potential dimensions of source 
credibility were found: perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction, and perceived 
worthiness. Moreover, we found that there are 13 Facebook-based source characteristics that influence 
Facebook users to judge the attacker according to one of the credibility dimensions. That is, the source 
characteristics that have an impact on the perceived sincerity dimension are: 1) number of friends (the 
number of members the source is connected to), 2) common friends (the number of members that the 
source and the user are connected to in common), 3) number of posts that the source has made, 4) 
common beliefs (sharing a common religion with the user), and 5) the source’s use of a real name (not 
using a nickname as an identifier). The source characteristics that have an impact on the perceived 
competence dimension are: 1) qualifications (educational level), 2) celebrity, and 3) wealth. The source 
characteristics that have an impact on the perceived attraction dimension are: 1) good looks and 2) good 
writing skills. The source characteristics that have an impact on the perceived worthiness dimension are: 
1) authority (power over the user), 2) sexual compatibility with the user, and 3) reciprocity (the 
compliments, likes, and positive comments received from the source). In the following sections we 
present overall summary about those four dimensions based on our previous qualitative work and 
supportive theoretical evidence from literature. 
 
Figure 1. Source Credibility Dimensions in Terms of Social Engineering on Facebook.  
Perceived Sincerity 
Sincerity is the degree to which the message receiver perceives the source as honest and free from 
duplicity. Source characteristics related to sincerity were repeatedly mentioned in the interviews that were 
conducted in the qualitative phase. For instance, one of the interviewee reported “The first thing I would 
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think about is honesty … you know, I have to make sure that he is not lying to me”. Participants also cited 
some factors that they consider when judging a Facebook user’s sincerity. Those factors are 1) number of 
friends (e.g., “If that was the case, he wouldn't have only a few friends ... The account was absolutely 
fake”); 2) number of posts (e.g., “I would make sure that it is not a fake profile by checking the user’s 
number of friends and the amount of content in the user’s account”); 3) having a friend in common with 
the source (e.g., “When I see that we have common friends, I say to myself, Maybe the system suggested 
that he add me to his friend list, so I accept the invitation”); 4) sharing the same beliefs (e.g., “having the 
same religion can make you sympathize with someone. I think it encourages you to help”); and 5) the 
use of a real name (e.g., “I think they [those who use nicknames] are trying to hide their reality from 
others and there must be a reason for that”). 
The role of perceived sincerity is explained in the literature by the factor model of Source credibility 
theory, which helps determine to what extent the receiver judges the source as credible. Perceived 
sincerity of a source makes the victim feel safe and therefore not perceive the threat. Safety, is the feeling 
of being protected from danger and risk. According to Pyszczynski et al. (1997), when people are 
threatened, they will alter their behavior depending on the number of risks they can accommodate. This 
modification is a psychological reaction that is determined by the seriousness of an attack and the amount 
of loss that they think will incur because of the occurrence of a hazard (Rosenstock 1974). This can explain 
how participants make judgment about sincerity of a source based on information available on the source 
profile such as number of friends, number of posts, using real name, and so on, which can give them 
perhaps some indications about the risk associated with such a source. The impact of number of friends 
and mutual friends can be explained further by the Principle of social proof. Social proof is doing what 
others do regardless of the importance or the correctness of that action (Lun et al. 2007). It is the 
influence of others on the behavior of someone. It can lead people to do things that might not be in their 
interest (Cialdini 2001). Social proof has been found to be one of the more powerful strategies in 
persuasion (Cialdini et al. 1999). The risk of this principle from the security perspective is that people 
behave according to the general attitude rather than what is secured. Social judgment theory can give an 
explanation about the impact of sharing the same belief on accepting a message. It suggests that people 
evaluate and judge the content of any message based on their anchors, or stance, on a particular topic or 
message. That is, people accept the message or reject it based on their cognitive map (Sherif and Hovland 
1961). We therefore hypothesize the following:  
Ha1: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively related to the perceived sincerity of the 
source. 
Hb1: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of friends increases. 
Hb2: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the number of friends they have in common with the     
source increases. 
Hb3: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the number of the source’s posts increases.  
Hb4: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to sharing the same beliefs or religion with the 
source.  
Hb5: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to the source’s use of a real name. 
Perceived Competence 
The second dimension of source characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge others as credible 
is the source’s competence or expertise. This concept represents the quality of being adequate and 
possessing a required skill or capacity. Three characteristics observed in the qualitative data reflect the 
dimension of competence: 1) qualifications (e.g., “I think that the primary benefit of social networks is 
that they allow you to build a network of qualified and expert people in your field”); 2) celebrity (e.g., 
“we always see them [celebrities] on TV, in the newspapers, and in the movies. They have become a part 
of our lives. I consider it reasonable to find myself trusting them or eager to communicate with them”); 
and 3) wealth (e.g., “I have never thought that this guy is a scammer. From his photos you can tell that 
he is well educated, drives luxury cars, and lives in a beautiful home”).  
The impact of perceived competence is strongly associated with trust in the literature. Trust has been 
studied in marketing in relation to persuasion, and it has been found that the characteristic of trusting 
people in advertisement is important in formulating marketing persuasion (Chen and Barnes 2007). 
Retailers utilize this weakness to persuade users that they have the endorsement of celebrities, high 
qualified, and wealthy people (Cialdini 2001). It has been shown through research that most people are 
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drawn closer to individuals they are fond of and they end up developing trust for them (Seiter and Gass 
2010). This explains why people tend to believe online professionals even if their expertise is not reflected 
in the profiles or sites that they operate. Trust has been studied in information systems as well, and it has 
been found that there is a strong relationship between trusting beliefs and trusting intentions (Vance et al. 
2008). This, therefore, leads users to become vulnerable to the trustee sources in a situation of 
uncertainty (Vance et al. 2008). The impact of educational level on the perceived competence has been 
argued in the literature. For example, Crisci and Kassinove (1973) have studied the impact of ("Dr." versus 
"Mr.") on behavioural compliance, and the result of their study has shown significant effect of educational 
level on the perceived competence. Research shows that people tend to trust other people because they are 
experts, popular (such as celebrities), and wealthy (Hadnagy 2010; Mitnick and Simon 2001). Ekman 
(2007) explains that these characteristics can be used to influence some people to do anything in order to 
get affection from those who have them. Social engineers could pretend to be celebrities, wealthy, or high 
educated in order to trick users into maintaining ties with them (Hadnagy 2010), and hence the 
hypotheses: 
Ha2: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively related to the perceived 
competence of the source. 
Hb6: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the source’s qualifications.  
Hb7: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the celebrity of the source. 
Hb8: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the wealth of the source. 
Perceived Attraction 
The dimension of attraction represents the feature or the quality that evokes interest and liking. Two 
characteristics observed in the qualitative data reflect the dimension of attractiveness: 1) good looks (e.g., 
“In a real life situation, it’s about attitude and personality and probably not about how bad-looking one 
is. But on Facebook, I would look at the photos initially to get a first impression”); and 2) good writing 
skills (e.g., “I spend most of my time on Facebook reading others’ posts or comments, so the first thing 
that attracts me is good writing. When I see an impressive post or comment, I immediately look at the 
profile of the person who wrote it, and sometimes I send the person a friend request”). 
The impact of attraction on accepting a message is associated with source likability in the literature. Ben 
Franklin effect theory states that when we like someone we are more willing to do him/her a favor (Jecker 
and Landy 1969). The reverse effect is also true. That is, when we do a person a favor, we tend to like them 
more as a result. It has been shown through research that people tend to communicate with other people 
because they are charming or attractive (Cialdini 2001; Ekman 2007). Several studies have been 
conducted in marketing research and the results of those studies concluded that communicators who have 
good looks are consistently liked more and have a positive impact on influencing others (Joseph 1982). 
The impact of writing skills on a message acceptance can be explained through the central route of 
Elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The central route uses message elaboration and 
can produce a positive attitude change and encourage the receiver to obey. Centrally routed messages 
include a wealth of information, rational arguments, and evidence to support a particular conclusion. If 
the argument of the message is strong, it will create a positive cognitive response in the minds of receivers 
while also positively aligning the receivers’ beliefs with those views of the persuader. On the other hand, if 
the argument is weak, it will produce a negative cognitive response to the persuasive message, which in 
turn prevents an attitude change and causes the receiver not to obey. Recent study on blog reading 
behavior found that textual characteristics that appeal to the sentiment of the reader affect both reader 
attraction and retention (Singh et al. 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
Ha3: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively related to the perceived 
attraction of the source. 
Hb9: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to the good looks of the source. 
Hb10: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to good writing by the source.  
Perceived Worthiness 
Perceived worthiness is the degree to which the source is perceived to be advantageous for the user to 
communicate with. In other words, it is the perceived benefit of the source, which inspires user’s effort, 
respect, and care. The difference between worthiness and the previous dimensions is that it represents the 
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potential benefit that the particular user can get from a source. Some participants of our qualitative work 
believe that the source must be worthy of their acceptance or response even if they believe the source is 
sincere, competence, or attractive (e.g., “If I care about him so much, I’m willing to do anything for him; 
I support him financially, and do everything I can for him. But if I don’t care about him, I don’t think 
that I’m willing to do that even if I believe that he is in need”). The characteristics that were mentioned by 
participants in relation to the users’ worthiness are 1) authority (e.g., “When I see a post from my boss, I 
feel hesitant to leave it without commenting, sharing, or at least clicking the ‘like’ button.”); 2) sexual 
compatibility (e.g., “If I have a chance to have a sexual relationship with someone I want, and I know 
that accepting the request will make it happen, I would accept it. I think anybody who says differently is 
lying“); and 3) reciprocity (e.g., ”Some of the users in my friend list always like and write good 
comments on my photos or posts, and I usually do the same for them to keep them around…generally 
speaking, I would try to make them happy and maintain a positive appearance for them”). 
The role of perceived worthiness is explained in the literature by the functional model of Source 
credibility theory, which views credibility as the degree to which a source meets a receiver's needs 
(Hovland et al. 1953). Politeness theory also gives further explanation about the impact of perceived 
worthiness on accepting social engineering request. Politeness theory states that in response to any 
request, people maintain one of the two following faces: a positive-based face or a negative-based face 
(Brown and Levinson 1987). A positive-based face is one which reflects appreciating, or respecting. A 
negative-based face is one when there is no constraint in any way. In addition, the Elaboration likelihood 
model states that there are two routes or methods to influence others: the central route and the peripheral 
route (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The peripheral route relies on a receiver’s emotional involvement and 
thus persuade through more superficial means. The influences that were explained by participants in 
regards to authority, sexual compatibility, and reciprocity are all examples of peripheral cues or routes of 
Elaboration likelihood model. O'Connor and Seymour (2011) hold that these behaviors are determined 
partially by balancing the perceived benefits over losses in choosing to behave in a certain way. Social 
engineers pretend to be sexual match or important people in order to trick users into maintaining ties 
with them (Hadnagy 2010). Past research has provided a proof of the degree to which a person should 
give in to the wishes of a person in authority (Marusca 2014). Compliance is a behavior that makes a 
person keep conforming to those who have power over them. Therefore, the use of influence of authority 
to instill terror or panic causes people to submit to the “authorities” instructions. Social engineering 
thrives on those people who give in to fear and orders from influential people (Mitnick and Simon 2001). 
Reciprocity has also been a subject of corporate research. When people receive a favor from other people, 
they develop a feeling of discordance until favors are reciprocated (Hadnagy 2010). A person will have a 
penchant to give back in an equal measure whenever a chance presents itself. The degree to which people 
reciprocate compliment depends on the intrinsic value of that compliment assigned by the receiver. With 
continued reciprocity, a psychological commitment to adhere to decisions made in the past is cultivated, 
and it will sustain a consistent behavior that is attached to the decisions a person makes (O'Connor and 
Seymour 2011). Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
Ha4: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively related to the perceived 
worthiness of the source. 
Hb11: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to the authority of the source.  
Hb12: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to their sexual compatibility with the source. 
Hb13: The perceived worthiness of a source increases as the compliments, likes, and positive comments 
received from the source increase. 
Method 
Role-Play (Scenario-Based) Experiment 
A type of experimental design called a role-play or scenario-based experiment was used to test the 
research hypotheses. In a role-play experiment, participants act out scripts, pictures, or examples based 
on real-life situations (Yardley-Matwiejczuk 1997). In the information security field, the role-play 
experiment method has been used in several phishing e-mail studies (e.g., (Dhamija et al. 2006; Downs et 
al. 2007; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 2012; Sheng et al. 2010)) in which participants were presented 
with images of e-mails and then asked how they would respond if they received such an e-mail. We used a 
role-play experimental questionnaire in this study by presenting Facebook profiles that represent some 
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source characteristics (manipulated variables) that we want to examine to the participants and asking 
them to rate every profile based on the information provided in those profiles. Every profile was presented 
along with a scenario that told the participants some information about the owner of the profile to 
enhance the participants’ perception regarding the characteristics under study. To measure the items 
related to the credibility dimensions, we used a 10-point semantic differential scale, which is a type of 
rating scale designed to measure the connotative meaning of concepts (Garland 1990). This type of scale 
has been widely employed in past source credibility studies (e.g., (McCroskey et al. 1974; Gaziano and 
McGrath 1986; Burgoon 1976; Eisend 2006)). 
To measure susceptibility to social engineering, we designed five social engineering requests (high risk 
actions) including tricks similar to those that have been used in real-life examples on Facebook such as 
Koobface, Zeus, Likejacking, Facebook Black, and Who-Viewed-Your-Profile attacks (Thomas and Nicol 
2010; Baumhof and Shipp 2012; Baltazar et al. 2009; Clark 2013; Sadeghian et al. 2013). Two additional 
low risk requests were added to the role-play questionnaire in order to examine the impact of the 
manipulated variables on those low risk requests, and see whether their impact is different than their 
impact on high risk social engineering requests. For example, instead of providing the URL 
“http://www.facebooc.com/login/” (which is a clearly fake website and considered to be high risk), we 
used the URL “http://bit.ly/anyw” (which is not always an attacking attempt, and therefore considered to 
be low risk). As presented in Table 1, persuasive messages were added to those requests to encourage the 
participants to respond to (accept) the requests. Since we wanted to study the impact of the source who 
sent the trick and not the trick itself, we wrote the messages in a way that made the participants rely more 
on the source who wrote the message, for example, the messages included phrases such as “I have checked 
this myself,” “I recommend that you download it,” and so on. The participants were asked to indicate how 
they would respond to those requests if they were sent to them or posted by the owners of every profile 
shown to them. A 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the participants’ consent intentions and 
behavior responses toward the social engineering requests, with a rating system of “Definitely yes” = 5, 
“Very probably yes” = 4, “Probably yes” = 3, “Very probably no” = 2, and “Definitely no” =1 (Albaum 
1997). All items were developed and validated using a specific pilot study, as will be explained in scale 
development and testing section.  
Social engineering tricks Persuasive messages Risk 
Clickjacking through a video. The message (post) presents a video of “great white 
shark tears a captain apart in seconds” while the actual URL is: http://bit.ly/anyw  
Note: The mouse pointer is positioned on the video and the actual URL destination 
is displayed in the status bar as it would be if users prepared to click on the link on 
their own computer. 
Most people can't watch this video for more 
than 25 seconds. It is really unbelievable! 
Low 
Clickjacking with executable file. The message offers a file that contains leaked 
government documents, while the actual extension is (.exe). The actual URL 
displayed in the status bar is: http://128.2.72.235/documents.jpg.exe 
I’m deeply shocked. And, what's more, 
ashamed! Check out these recently leaked 
government documents.  
High 
Phishing through a post offering free cell phone minutes. 
Yeah! Finally I found something for free. I 
received my minutes, and now you can too! 
High 
Downloading Who-Viewed-Your-Profile application/software. 
It is safe and works very well. I have 
checked this myself. I recommend that you 
download it. 
High 
Spam or malware, by giving permission/access to the site before it allows the 
user to see a video. 
Check this out. I watched it at least 20 
times. 
High 
Phishing through a message from Facebook that threatens account suspension. 
The link in the message is written as: https://www.facebook.com/ while the actual 
URL displayed in the status bar is: http://www.facebooc.com/login/ 
Facebook started closing fake and duplicate 
accounts. Update your account soon. This is 
serious, I lost my old account :(  
High 
Clickjacking through a message containing a link that is written on the message 
as: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quali&fes 
while the actual URL displayed in the status bar is: http://bit.ly/anuyy 
Take a look at this video that I found of 
(guess who?) – it’s hilarious !  
Low 
Table 1. Social Engineering Requests/Tricks and Persuasive Messages.  
Manipulated Variables Using a Fractional Factorial Design 
Fractional factorial design (Gunst and Mason 2009) was used to design and manipulate the variables 
under study. This design allows researchers to minimize the number of experiments to utilize the 
participants’ time and efforts better, and it provides a good way to calculate the effect of each source 
characteristic individually and interactively with others (Dey 1985). Based on the hypotheses that we 
wanted to examine, and using fractional factorial design, only 20 different Facebook profiles needed to be 
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designed to examine the effectiveness of every variable of the 13 Facebook-based source characteristics 
(included in Hb1 t0 Hb13) that influence users to judge the attacker as credible, as represented in Table 2. 
Each profile represented one experiment, and each experiment was a combination of a low level, 
represented by (-), or high level, represented by (+), of the 13 source characteristics under study. Table 2 
shows the characteristics for every profile that was shown to the participants in every experiment. For 
example, experiment 1 (Facebook profile 1) included a low number of friends, a high number of common 
friends, a high number of posts, a different belief (religion) than the participant, and a nickname as a 
profile identifier. For the rest of the source characteristics that were not related to the design of a 
particular experiment, such as good looking within experiment 1, we tried to make them as average as 
possible. To estimate the effect of one characteristic (manipulated variable), we calculated the variance 
and the effect size for its corresponding high level group, and compared it with its low level group. For 
example, if we wanted to calculate the effect of the variable “number of friends,” we calculated the 
answers from experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 as one component (representing the low level group), and 
compared it with the answers from experiments 5, 6, 7, and 8 as another component (high level group).   
For some characteristics, such as sexual compatibility, we used different profiles representative of men 
and women. Part of the challenge in this stage was the difficulty of choosing people who were well known 
to the participants and who represented some of the experiments in the design well. The same difficulty 
was faced while preparing experiments 13 to 16, for which we needed to find posts that could be perceived 
as impressive or well written and other posts that could be perceived as badly written. Therefore, this task 
was done using two steps and two different groups of participants. The first group (44 women and 49 
men) was asked to suggest or name up to three people for every experiment. This task was performed in a 
computer lab where the Internet was provided to the participants to help them choose, search, and take 
snapshots, and then e-mail their suggestions to the researcher. Then, the names of the people who were 
suggested more times by the first group were provided to the second group (46 women and 43 men) to 
rate every individual based on the characteristics under study. The same procedures were performed in 
regard to choosing the posts that represented low and high levels of writing skills. 
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Profile/Experiment 1 - + + - -         
Profile/Experiment 2 - - - - +         
Profile/Experiment 3 - + - + -         
Profile/Experiment 4 - - + + +         
Profile/Experiment 5 + - + - -         
Profile/Experiment 6 + + - - +         
Profile/Experiment 7 + - - + -         
Profile/Experiment 8 + + + + +         
Profile/Experiment 9      + + +      
Profile/Experiment 10      - - +      
Profile/Experiment 11      + - -      
Profile/Experiment 12      - + -      
Profile/Experiment 13         + +    
Profile/Experiment 14         - -    
Profile/Experiment 15         - +    
Profile/Experiment 16         + -    
Profile/Experiment 17           + + + 
Profile/Experiment 18           - - + 
Profile/Experiment 19           + - - 
Profile/Experiment 20           - + - 
Table 2. The Design of the Experiments Based on Fractional Factorial Design.  
Scale Development and Testing   
As suggested by DeVellis (2012), we started with the representative items that have been used in the 
literature to measure the credibility. Second, we added other potential items that emerged from our 
previous work to the representative items that were drawn from the literature. The sample items were 
then assessed using the Delphi method. Delphi method is a structured,  systematic, and interactive 
technique, which relies on a panel of experts. Those experts evaluate items under study in two or more 
rounds. After each round, experts are encouraged to refine their earlier items in light of the replies of 
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other members of their panel. It is believed that during this process, the range of the items will decrease 
and the group will converge towards the correct items (Coates 1975; Dalkey and Helmer 1963). During the 
scale development and testing of this study, five information systems scholars were asked to evaluate the 
items of source credibility dimensions and make any necessary changes in order to eliminate repetitive 
items, non-user oriented items, and ambiguous items. The suggested measurement scale included 
differential semantic items that were given to the participants to rate the credibility dimensions of 
different Facebook profiles shown to them. In addition, social engineering requests that measure 
sucseptibility to social engineering have been tested using similar method. Three information security 
scholars were asked to evaluate the designed requests and make any required changes before we used 
them. The items of the credibility dimesnsions as well as the social engineering requests were then tested 
in a pilot study (before the present study), using a role-play experimental questionnaire. In total, 120 
subjects participated in the pilot study by rating 2,400 Facebook profiles. 
Approach and Procedures 
After verifying the existence of the four dimensions in terms of the credibility of social engineering on 
Facebook and developing a valid measurement scale for measuring those dimensions and susceptibility to 
social engineering victimization, we conducted the present experiment using the validated measument 
scale that emerged from the pilot study. A letter of invitation for participation was sent to various 
organizations asking the directors if they would be willing to disseminate it to their personnel. Few 
organizations accepted the request. However, in order to avoid sample bias, ensure variation in 
demographics (e.g., gender, age, education level, security knowledge/awareness, and interest), and 
estimate nonresponse error, only three organizations, selectively, were recruited. The letter of invitation 
was distributed by email in a first and second round. Twitter and Facebook were also utilized as a third 
round (the invitation was posted on the three organizations’ pages/accounts, and it was clearly mentioned 
that the participants had to be from these organizations). The first organization operates in the petroleum 
industry, the second organization operates in education, and the third organization operates in electricity 
production. All of the organizations are located in Saudi Arabia, where the characters (e.g., celebrities) 
used as experimental treatments were chosen from. In order to encourage more people to participate and 
to screen out those participants who were not paying attention to the questions, we offered to pay five US 
dollars to those participants that qualified by answering five qualifying questions, which could be 
answered correctly by a careful reading of the profiles’ contents and the provided scenarios. In total, 377 
participants completed the entire study, which constituted 7,540 profile observations for the required 20 
experiments. The 20 profiles and their corresponding questions were displayed to the participants in 
random order. The overall response rate was 51% (43%, 63%, and 47% for the first, second, and third 
organizations, respectively). While 377 participants completed the entire study, only 37 participants 
started the experiment but did not complete them. These rates are considered to be average and similar to 
those reported by the majority of information systems research (Sivo et al. 2006). The participants who 
completed the study represented diversity in demographics, including both genders (around 60% male 
and 40% female), a variety of ages (around 30% from 18-25, 20% from 26-35, 25% from 36-45, and 25% 
over 45 years old), a variety of education levels (around 25% lower than a bachelor’s degree, 35% 
bachelor’s, 25% master’s, and 15% PhD), and a variety of security knowledge levels (around 20% Level 1 
(lowest), 40% Level 2, 20% Level 3, and 20% Level 4 (highest)). Around 65% of the participants 
responded after the first round of recruitment (using email), 20% after the second round (using email), 
and 15% after the third round (using Facebook and Twitter). 
Although some researchers suggest asking participants about their demographics at the end of a 
questionnaire, we found that some demographics questions must be asked at the beginning of a 
questionnaire in order to examine the impact of some manipulated variables, such as sexual compatibility, 
celebrity, and common belief, which vary based on the participant’s demographics. Therefore, 
participants were asked about their basic demographic information first, such as age and gender, and then 
specific profiles were displayed to them based on their demographics. The rest of the demographics were 
asked at the end of the questionnaire. Moreover, in similar role-play studies (e.g., (Sheng et al. 2010)) 
there was no difference between the impact of asking participants about their demographics at the 
beginning and the end of the questionnaire. All demographic information asked was basic and 
straightforward and used multiple choice answers, except the information related to the participant’s 
security knowledge (security awareness level). For the security knowledge, we adapted four simple 
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questions used by (Sheng et al. 2010), where the participants were asked to choose the best definition for 
four terms related to computer security: “cookie,” “phishing,” “spyware,” and “virus,” and they were given 
the same list of eight possible definitions to choose from for each. Questions and items have been 
presented in both English and Arabic language. All the activities of this study were categorized under 
“Low Risk Applications” in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research 
Involving Humans, and they were approved by Human Research Ethics Committee at Queensland 
University of Technology. Key Survey 8.4 was used for the experimental questionnaire design and online 
data collection, and SPSS version 21.0 as well as AMOS version 22.0 were used in the data analysis.  
Results 
Factor Analysis and Data Screening 
We started the analysis by assessing the requirements involved in structural equation modeling (SEM), 
which include: limited missing values; free of extreme outliers; not distorted significantly by the different 
opinions of specific groups; and the assumptions of normality and linearity upheld. Then, we computed 
the reliability coefficients of the scales using Cronbach’s alpha. Our previous work regarding scale 
development and testing, which was done prior to the present study using a pilot study, helped in 
eliminating problematic measurement items. As presented in Table 3, the overall reliability of Cronbach’s 
alpha value for the overall items used in the study was 0.94, and the Cronbach’s alpha values for perceived 
sincerity (6 items), perceived competence (6 items), perceived attraction (6 items), perceived worthiness 
(6 items), and susceptibility to social engineering (5 items) were 0.93, 0.96, 0.94, 0.94, and 0.90, 
respectively. After testing reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, the semantic differential data were submitted 
to the principal component factor analyses implemented in SPSS. The factor analysis revealed five factors 
(four for credibility dimensions and one for susceptibility to social engineering) with an eigenvalue of 1 or 
greater. Table 3 shows the overall factor and item properties. 
Factor (Dimension) 
Properties 
Items 
Number of 
Observations 
Loading Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error  
Name: Sincerity 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.93 
Eigenvalue: 4.88 
Variance Explained: .16 
Honest/Dishonest 7540 0.728 4.34 1.79 0.018 
Sincere/Insincere 7540  0.851 4.56 1.99 0.020 
Trustworthy/Not Trustworthy 7540 0.837 4.60 1.99 0.020 
Safe/Dangerous 7540  0.841 4.57 2.0 0.021 
Believable/Unbelievable 7540  0.850 4.58 2.0 0.021 
Real Account/Fake Account 7540  0.835 4.50 1.9 0.019 
Name: Competence 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.96 
Eigenvalue: 5.31 
Variance Explained: .18 
Professional/Unprofessional 7540  0.872 4.45 2.12 0.024 
Competent/Incompetent 7540  0.843 4.50 2.11 0.024 
Qualified/Unqualified 7540  0.881 4.43 2.13 0.025 
Powerful/Powerless 7540  0.860 4.51 2.12 0.024 
Expert/Inexpert 7540  0.873 4.46 2.14 0.024 
Successful/Unsuccessful 7540  0.874 4.43 2.15 0.024 
Name: Attraction 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.94 
Eigenvalue: 4.76 
Variance Explained: .16 
Attractive/Unattractive 7540  0.847 4.44 1.89 0.025 
Expressive/Inexpressive 7540  0.826 4.58 1.98 0.025 
Appealing/Unappealing 7540  0.774 4.81 1.93 0.024 
Interesting/Uninteresting 7540  0.817 4.64 1.95 0.024 
Cheerful/Gloomy 7540  0.803 4.57 1.94 0.024 
Exciting/Dull 7540  0.851 4.50 1.93 0.024 
Name: Worthiness 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.94 
Eigenvalue: 4.78 
Variance Explained: .16 
Worthwhile/Worthless 7540  0.819 5.04 1.95 0.019 
Advantageous/Disadvantageous 7540  0.772 4.81 1.96 0.020 
Beneficial/Unbeneficial 7540  0.805 5.12 1.94 0.020 
Useful/Useless 7540  0.840 4.99 1.90 0.020 
Eligible/Not Eligible 7540 0.838 4.98 1.91 0.021 
Valuable/Invaluable 7540  0.807 5.02 1.98 0.020 
Name: Susceptibility to Social 
Engineering 
Cronbach’s alpha: .90 
Eigenvalue: 2.79 
Variance Explained: .10 
SE Request1 7540  0.654 2.71 0.68 0.007 
SE Request2 7540  0.670 2.72 0.69 0.007 
SE Request3 7540  0.658 2.70 0.69 0.008 
SE Request4 7540  0.665 2.70 0.68 0.007 
SE Request5 7540  0.660 2.72 0.68 0.007 
Table 3. Dimensions and Item Properties.  
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Testing Hypotheses Ha1 to Ha4  
Hypotheses Ha1 to Ha4 propose that there are positive relationships between susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization and the perceived sincerity, competence, attraction, and worthiness of the 
source. In other words, we wanted to examine the possibility of predicting susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization based on the perceived sincerity, competence, attraction, and worthiness of the 
source. For more validity and to gain more explanation about the impact of the factors involved in the 
hypotheses (Ha1 to Ha4), we ran hierarchical regression analyses using SPSS 21.0. We estimated four 
hierarchical regression analyses for four different models. The first model only contained perceived 
sincerity as a predictor of social engineering victimization. In the second to fourth models, we added one 
more independent factor each time to the previous model in a stepwise manner. The rationale for using 
this technique is to see whether the resulting model improves by including the four factors of perceived 
sincerity, competence, attraction, and worthiness as predictors. In other words, we will be able to see how 
much better the explanatory power becomes if a particular dimension is added or deleted (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2001). However, linear regression requires some assumptions to be met, including the 
assumption of the reliability of the measurement, linearity, homoscedasticity, and normality of the error 
distribution (Osborne and Waters 2002). The reliability of measurement has been explained in the 
previous sections, and we showed that this assumption has been met. Further tests were conducted in 
regard to the linearity, homoscedasticity, and normality of the error distribution, and the results showed 
that our data met the acceptable levels regarding these issues. Table 4 shows the coefficients that resulted 
from the hierarchical linear regression analysis, and the four estimated model summaries.  
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
F 
Change 
Sig. of F 
Change 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 1.778 .015  118.491 <.0001   
.37 .37 742.7 <.0001 
Sincerity .206 .003 .609 66.722 <.0001 1.000 1.000 
2 
(Constant) 1.424 .014  99.932 <.0001   
.54 .54 470.2 <.0001 Sincerity .156 .003 .461 56.333 <.0001 .891 1.123 
Competence .130 .002 .448 54.744 <.0001 .891 1.123 
3 
(Constant) 1.241 .015  83.618 <.0001   
.60 .60 162.9 <.0001 
Sincerity .129 .003 .380 46.282 <.0001 .792 1.263 
Competence .114 .002 .392 49.087 <.0001 .840 1.191 
Attraction .083 .003 .243 29.474 <.0001 .786 1.273 
4 
(Constant) 1.041 .015  67.593 <.0001   
.64 .64 168.4 <.0001 
Sincerity .140 .003 .412 52.751 <.0001 .779 1.284 
Competence .086 .002 .271 36.276 <.0001 .717 1.395 
Attraction .042 .003 .123 14.163 <.0001 .630 1.589 
Worthiness .093 .003 .295 31.061 <.0001 .623 1.604 
Table 4. Coefficient Results of the Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis. 
The results presented in Table 4, showed that every factor of perceived sincerity, competence, attraction, 
and worthiness significantly contributed to the prediction of susceptibility to social engineering 
victimization and the overall model fit gained significant improvement every time. That is, adding these 
factors step-by-step increased the R square of the regression models from 0.37 for estimated model 1 
(which has perceived sincerity only as a predictor) to 0.64 for estimated model 4 (which considers 
perceived sincerity, competence, attraction, and worthiness as predictors). This increase happened with 
the changes in R square being significant in each step (F change = 742.7, p < 0.01 for model 1; F change = 
500.0, p < 0.01 for model 2; F change = 156.3, p < 0.01 for model 3; and F change = 170.2, p < 0.01 for 
model 4). This provides more evidence that our proposed model (model 4 in Table 4) has more 
explanatory power. The coefficient results presented in Table 4 for the final model (model 4) show that all 
the correlation coefficients were significant at p < 0.001, and that perceived sincerity was the strongest 
predictor, with beta value = 0.412; then perceived worthiness, with beta value = .295; perceived 
competence, with beta value = .271; and perceived attraction, with beta value = .123. The results also 
showed a high percentage explained by the model, with R² = 0.64. We can see that these results are not 
identical, but very similar, to the values from AMOS 22.0, which is a normal and common occurrence in 
such statistical applications. Finally, the collinearity statistics were examined. Multi-collinearity is present 
when tolerance is close to 0 (< 0.01 ) or variance inflation factor (VIF) is high (> 10), in which case the 
beta and p coefficients may be unstable. The VIF and tolerance measures shown in Table 4 suggest that 
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multi-collinearity is not an issue in our data. We can conclude that we have enough evidence to accept 
hypotheses Ha1 to Ha4. 
Testing Hypotheses Hb1 to Hb13  
To test these hypotheses we conducted t-tests to evaluate the differences between the participants’ 
responses toward the credibility dimensions, for the profiles that contained low levels of the treatments 
(the variables under study) and compared them with the profiles that contained high levels of the 
treatments. We started by testing hypotheses Hb1 to Hb5, which propose that the perceived sincerity of a 
source increases, and as the source’s number of friends, the number of friends the user has in common 
with the source, and the source’s number of posts increase, and that the perceived sincerity of a source is 
positively related to sharing the same beliefs and the source’s use of a real name.  As explained earlier, our 
fractional factorial design contains eight experiments (profiles) for perceived sincerity: four contain a low 
level of the variable under study, and the other four contain a high level of the variable under study. For 
example, for the variable “number of friends” we conducted t-tests to measure the difference between the 
participants’ responses toward perceived sincerity for experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 (since they were given 
profiles that contained a low number of friends) and compared them with the participants’ responses 
toward perceived sincerity for experiments 5, 6, 7, and 8 (since they were given profiles that contained a 
high number of friends). Cohen’s distance (d) was also used along with the t-test comparisons, in order to 
present the differences between the groups in terms of standard deviation units (Cohen 1977). Table 5 
presents the results of t-tests and effect size estimations for the hypotheses from Hb1 to Hb13. 
Constructs (hypotheses) 
Treatment 
Group 
Cases (N) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean T Value P 
Mean 
Difference 
Cohen's d 
    Number of Friends (Hb1) 
   Low Level  1508  1.119257  4.0752 
 -33.493  <.0001  1.834 1.219  
   High Level  1508  1.809194  5.9101 
    Number of Common 
    Friends (Hb2) 
   Low Level  1508  1.080642  4.3256 
-22.464   <.0001 1.334 0.818 
   High Level  1508  2.03764  5.6598 
    Number of Posts (Hb3) 
   Low Level  1508  1.37236  4.3715 
 -20.69 <.0001  1.242  0.753 
   High Level  1508  1.88538  5.6139 
    Common Belief (Hb4) 
   Low Level  1508  1.28314  4.6149 
-12.053 <.0001   0.755 0.439 
   High Level  1508  2.06843  5.3705 
    Real Name (Hb5) 
   Low Level  1508  0.77483  4.2234 
 -26.653 <.0001   1.538 0.970 
   High Level  1508  2.10369  5.762 
    Qualifications (Hb6) 
   Low Level   754  1.00983  3.3967 
 -23.577 <.0001 1.674   1.214 
   High Level   754  1.66828  5.0711 
    Celebrity (Hb7) 
   Low Level   754  1.03808  3.2069 
 -32.067 <.0001  2.054 1.651 
   High Level   754  1.42001  5.2611 
    Wealth (Hb8) 
   Low Level   754  1.04701  3.8464 
 -9.610 <.0001 0.775  0.494 
   High Level   754  1.95180  4.6216 
     Good Looks (Hb9) 
   Low Level   754  1.13137  3.0009 
 -29.902  <.0001  2.213 1.540  
   High Level   754  1.68897  5.2146 
     Good Writing Skills (Hb10) 
   Low Level   754  0.83095  3.8450 
 -5.682  <.0001  0.525 0.292 
   High Level   754  2.3994  4.3705 
      Authority (Hb11) 
   Low Level   754  0.60613  3.9812 
 -72.586  <.0001  3.775 3.738 
   High Level   754  1.29313  7.7564 
Sexual Compatibility (Hb12) 
   Low Level   754  1.57132  5.3689 
 -9.321  <.0001 0.999  0.480 
   High Level   754  2.49111  6.3687 
      Reciprocity (Hb13) 
   Low Level   754  1.61952  5.3718 
-9.264   <.0001 0.994  0.477 
   High Level   754  2.46121  6.3658 
Table 5. T-Tests and Effect Sizes for Hypotheses Hb1-Hb13. 
As presented in Table 5, the t-tests show significant effects of the treatments on the perception of 
sincerity, with (p value < 0.0001, t value = -33.4, and Cohen’s d = 1.219) for the number of friends; (p 
value < 0.0001, t value = -22.4, and Cohen’s d = 0.818) for the number of common friends; (p value < 
0.0001, t value = -20.69, and Cohen’s d = 0.753) for the number of posts; (p value < 0.0001, t value = -
12.053, and Cohen’s d = 0.439) for sharing a common belief; and (p value < 0.0001, t value = -26.653, 
and Cohen’s d = 0.970) for using a real name. Similar techniques were used to test hypotheses Hb6 to 
Hb13, in which we conducted t-tests and used Cohen’s d to measure the participant’s responses toward 
perceived competence, perceived attraction, and perceived worthiness. As presented in Table 5, the t-tests 
 Susceptibility to Social Engineering Victimization in Social Networking Sites 
 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 14 
show significant effects of the source’s qualifications, celebrity, and wealth on influencing users to 
perceive the source as competent. The t-tests also show significant effects of the source’s good looks and 
the source’s good writing skills on influencing users to perceive the source as attractive. Similarly, t-test 
shows that the authority of the source, sexual compatibility with the source, and the reciprocity have 
significant effects on users’ perceptions of worthiness. Therefore, we can conclude that we have enough 
evidence to accept hypotheses Hb1 to Hb13. 
Demographics Analysis 
Although we have examined the impact of the source’s characteristics on the participants’ perceptions 
toward the source credibility dimensions during the hypotheses testing, it would also be interesting to 
examine whether any of those characteristics have significantly different impacts on any particular 
demographic group. For this purpose, we ran a two-way ANOVA to examine whether there were any 
significant interactions between the effects of the source’s characteristics (which are the treatments given 
to the participants) and the participants’ demographic groups. Table 6 presents all the interactions that 
are significant at p < = 0.05, as well as the pairwise comparisons (measuring the difference between the 
differences, which occurred due to the treatments).  
Interaction Specifications 
Effect of the Treatment 
(Mean Difference) for These Demographic Group Interaction F Sig 
Observed 
Power 
P. Eta 
Square 
Number of Friends with 
User’s Gender 
109.7 <.0001 1.0 0.036 
Female Male 
0.811 2.34 
Number of Common 
Friends with User’s 
Educational Level 
2.75 0.04 0.67 0.003 
Lower than 
Bachelor 
Bachelor Masters 
PhD or 
Doctorate 
0.86 1.20 1.62 1.64 
Number of Posts with User’s 
Educational Level 
2.09 0.05 0.64 .002 
Lower than 
Bachelor 
Bachelor Masters 
PhD or 
Doctorate 
0.89 1.17 1.41 1.55 
Using Real Name with User 
Gender 
33.59 <.0001 1.0 0.011 
Female Male 
2.20 1.20 
Qualifications with User’s 
Gender 
7.72 0.005 0.79 0.005 
Female Male 
1.90 1.20 
Qualifications with User’s 
Security Knowledge 
7.15 <.0001 0.99 0.019 
Lowest Level Level  2 Level 3 Level 4 Highest Level 
1.74 1.71 1.52 1.17 0.39 
Qualifications with User’s 
Age 
2.64 0.031 0.743 0.007 
18-25 Years 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 and Over 
1.06 1.03 1.45 1.58 1.71 
Celebrity with User’s Age 3.32 0.01 0.84 0.009 
18-25 Years 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 and Over 
2.29 1.87 1.91 1.53 1.39 
Celebrity with User’s Gender 10.8 0.001 0.90 0.008 
Female Male 
2.26 1.62 
Wealth with User’s Gender 53.8 <.0001 1.0 0.036 
Female Male 
2.050 0.480 
Good Looks with User’s 
Gender 
8.75 0.003 0.84 0.006 
Female Male 
2.60 1.95 
Authority with User’s 
Educational Level 
3.76 0.01 0.76 0.007 
Lower than 
Bachelor 
Bachelor Masters 
PhD or 
Doctorate 
3.71 3.41 3.68 3.90 
Table 6. Significant Interactions Between Treatment Effects and User Demographics. 
Although all hypothesized source characteristics were found to induce a significant influence on the users’ 
judgments for all demographic groups, the results presented in Table 6 show that some source 
characteristics have even more impact on particular demographic groups. For example, we can see that 
the source’s number of friends has a statistically significant interaction with the user’s gender (F = 109, p 
< 0.0001). By running pairwise comparisons, we can see that the number of friends has more impact on 
males, with a mean difference = 2.34, compared to a mean difference = 0.811 for females. The partial eta 
square presented in the table shows the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is explained 
by the independent variable, and the observed power shows that our sample size was adequate (Cohen 
1977). Finally, all the post-hoc tests, which compared the groups presented in the table with each other, 
were statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
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Then, we examined the relationship between demographics and susceptibility to social engineering by 
measuring the participants’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization in general, and regardless of 
the source’s type of influence. This was done first by measuring the participants’ responses to the five high 
risk social engineering requests. As presented in Table 7, a regression analysis shows that the participants’ 
security knowledge significantly and linearly predicts their susceptibility to social engineering 
victimization (beta value = -0.10, p < 0.0001). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the security 
knowledge groups shows that the more security knowledge the participants have, the less susceptible they 
are (F(4, 7535) = 99.25, p < 0.0001). The results also show that gender has a significant effect on 
susceptibility to social engineering (beta value = -0.05, p < 0.0001), with a t-test showing that women are 
more susceptible than men (t(7538) = 10.423, p < 0.0001). In addition, the results show that the time 
elapsed since joining Facebook is a significant predictor of susceptibility to social engineering (beta value 
= -0.02, p = 0.001), and an ANOVA test shows that the less time elapsed, the more susceptible the user is 
(F(4,7535) = 10.59, p < .0001). Finally, the results show that age is a significant predictor of susceptibility 
to social engineering (beta value = -0.04, p < 0.0001), and the ANOVA tests show that young adults are 
more susceptible to social engineering (F(4,7535) = 15.06, p < .0001).  
Regression Analysis Variance Tests 
Means 
 Demographic 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Sig 
T or F 
Values 
Sig 
 Security knowledge - .10 <.0001 F = 99.25 <0.0001 
Lowest Level Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Highest Level 
2.89 2.76 2.74 2.69 2.40 
 Gender - .05 <.0001 T = 10.42 <0.0001 
Female Male 
2.81 2.66 
 Time elapsed since 
  joining Facebook  
- .02 .001 F = 10.59 <0.0001 
6 Months 
or Less 
6 Months to 
1 Year 
1 to 2 
Years 
2 to 3 
Years 
More than 
3 Years 
2.80 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.63 
 Age - .04 <.0001 F = 15.06 <0.0001 
18-25 Years 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 and Over 
2.81 2.70 2.68 2.69 2.66 
Table 7. Regression Analysis for Demographic Groups and Group Differences. 
Finally, we examined the participants’ responses toward the two low risk requests. The rationale behind 
adding these requests and analyzing them was to examine to what extent participants rely on the source’s 
characteristics when they respond to social engineering requests. The results showed that the participants 
were affected by the source’s characteristics when they were encountered by high risk social engineering 
requests and low risk requests, with no significant difference. The results of the demographics analysis are 
interesting in a number of ways. First, they provide more validity in regard to the questions used to 
measure susceptibility to social engineering victimization. That is, the results showed that the requests 
used to measure social engineering mimic real life situations, where those tricks are more identifiable by 
people who are knowledgeable about security but not by normal users, including highly educated people 
in different study areas. Second, the results show that the majority of the participants in this study relied 
on the source’s characteristics when they answered the experimental questionnaire, and therefore, the 
results give more validity that the arguments used in the messages have achieved the goal, which is 
studying the impact of the source characteristics. Third, although the security knowledgeable people were 
less willing to respond to social engineering requests, the results show that the source’s characteristics still 
have influence on them to accept social engineering requests from attackers that look credible to them 
(since the beta value was only -0.10).  
Structural Model and Fitting Assessment 
Model fit assessment was performed on the model using AMOS (version 22.0) to confirm whether the 
collected data are an appropriate fit to the hypothesized model. The values of the correlations between 
Sincerity, Competence, Attraction, Worthiness, and Susceptibility to Social Engineering Victimization 
(SE_ Susceptibility) provided an indication of the discriminant validity, where all correlations were less 
than .55 between the independent constructs and less than .70 when both independent and dependent 
constructs were included. This validity refers to the extent to which a construct is distinct from other 
constructs (Hair et al. 2006). In addition, all the factor loadings were high and significant at the p < .01 
level, suggesting convergent validity. This validity refers to the degree to which an item is related to the 
construct (Hair et al. 2006). The 13 Facebook-based characteristics are not included in the model since they 
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were given directly as treatments, and therefore they were assessed using a t-test and an analysis of variance. 
We can see in Figure 2 that some values (e.g., beta values and model fit) are not identical, but very similar, 
to the results of SPSS, which is a normal and common occurrence in such statistical applications. In 
addition, assessments were done in regard to the goodness of fit. The resulted model appears to have a 
good fit, with the following values: minimum discrepancy (chi-square, χ²) divided by the degrees of 
freedom (df) = 4.75; goodness of fit index (GFI) = .98; comparative fit index (CFI) = .99; incremental fit 
index (IFI) = .99; and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .022. These values satisfy the 
requirements suggested by structural equation modeling (Hair et al. 2006; Hooper et al. 2008). 
 
Figure 2: Model Fit Assessment, Using AMOS 22.0 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of this study have shown that every factor of the perceived sincerity, competence, attraction, 
and worthiness of a source are significant predictors of susceptibility to social engineering victimization, 
with a high percentage of the variance explained. Perceived sincerity was found to induce the most 
influence on users’ judgment toward accepting or rejecting social engineering-based attacks on Facebook, 
then perceived worthiness, perceived competence, and perceived attraction. The results also explained 
which, and to which extent, source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker according 
to one of the source credibility dimensions. That is, the results have shown that the source characteristics 
that have a significant impact on perceived sincerity, ordered by the most effective influence, are 1) 
number of friends, 2) the source’s use of a real name, 3) common friends, 4) number of posts, and 5) 
common beliefs. The source characteristics that have an impact on perceived competence, ordered by the 
most effective influence, are 1) celebrity, 2) qualifications (educational level), and 3) wealth. The source 
characteristics that have an impact on perceived attraction, ordered by the most effective influence, are 1) 
good looks and 2) good writing skills. The source characteristics that have an impact on perceived 
worthiness, ordered by the most effective influence, are 1) authority, 2) sexual compatibility, and 3) 
reciprocity. These characteristics render Facebook users susceptible to attackers, who can use fake 
profiles, accounts, pages, and identities to entrap victims.  
Moreover, the results have shown that demographic groups differ in their perceptions and behaviors 
toward social engineering requests. To the best of our knowledge, no study has been dedicated to 
understanding which demographic variables correlate with falling victim to social engineering-based 
attacks in SNSs. However, there are some studies that have been done in regard to phishing e-mails, 
which usually use social engineering-based persuasion but in a different environment than SNSs. Those 
studies have indicated that there is a relationship between falling victim to phishing e-mails and 
demographic variables such as age, gender, and educational level. In this study, we investigated the 
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relationship between falling victim to social engineering victimization in a new environment, Facebook, 
and we went further by investigating the relationship between demographic variables and different tricks 
that are used by attackers to influence users to become victims. The results have shown that people are 
different in their judgments and vulnerabilities, and therefore measuring susceptibility should be done by 
using the type of trick and not only whether the user became a victim or not, as has been done repeatedly 
in phishing e-mail studies. 
The findings of the research must be viewed in light of the following limitations. First, due to the 
challenges of the ethical issues associated with running this experiment in the actual Facebook 
environment, permission issues from the owners of Facebook, and to conduct the study in accordance 
with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans, we have used a role-play 
experiment. Using a role-play (scenario-based) experiment to measure users’ behaviors may arguably 
differ from using an actual experiment. However, various studies have confirmed the degree of realism 
and involvement that can be achieved in role-playing studies (e.g., (Haney et al. 1973; Mixon 1972; 
O'Leary et al. 1970; Dhamija et al. 2006; Downs et al. 2007; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 2012; Sheng et 
al. 2010)). Moreover, the several reliability and validity tests performed on the collected data of this study 
suggest that there is no reason to believe that the predictors described in this study should differ in their 
relationship to role-play behavior compared to real-world behavior. Second, while we have taken 
intensive steps to ensure the use of representative social engineering-based requests, we cannot guarantee 
that we have covered all types of tricks that can be used by attackers. In fact, social engineering is very 
broad, and it is sometimes difficult to classify a request as an attacking attempt or legitimate request 
(purely risky or purely safe). However, the focus of this study was on the characteristics of the source who 
sends the message, not the message’s characteristics itself. In addition, with adequate consistency among 
the requests for all the experiments and enough variance between each experiment (treatment) and the 
others, validity for the requests used to measure social engineering susceptibility was achieved.  
The overall results speak to the simplicity with which individuals can be deceived in SNSs, the theoretical 
reasons for why and how individuals fall victim to social engineering attacks, and the ways in which 
organizations’ security defenses can be compromised through such deceptions. The findings have a 
number of important implications. First, identifying the links between the source’s characteristics and the 
users’ (as receivers) characteristics is a crucial step in data science, because it provides a theoretical 
foundation for developing effective applications and users’ profiling mechanisms, which can automatically 
predict users’ susceptibility to social engineering attacks based on their demographics. The results of this 
study are also crucial for organizational policy makers who aim to control insider threats based on 
theoretical knowledge. The findings of this study are also very useful for security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA) programs; and computer monitoring, which have been suggested as the best practices 
for deterring human-based information security incidents (D'Arcy et al. 2009). They can be very helpful 
as well for software engineers and SNS providers, because they point out that the lack of authentication of 
identities, photos, applications, and pages make SNSs dangerous weapons in the hands of scammers and 
social engineers who may take criminal advantage of users. The source characteristics that were found in 
this study are freely available for the attackers, they have a strong influence on users to fall victim to social 
engineering, and therefore they require urgent authentication solutions. SNS providers are encouraged to 
establish mechanisms that can help users make better judgments about the credibility of others. 
Feasibility studies could be conducted to see whether showing some real information about SNSs users, 
such as their locations, frequency of use, and multiple profile usage can reduce the risks associated with 
impersonation and identity theft in SNSs. Showing friendship requests that the user has received and that 
the user has sent can also help those who rely on the number of friends (as a reputation clue) when they 
make judgments about the credibility of a source. Applications that automatically friend others, create 
posts, and send messages to other users must be controlled. Phone numbers, formal e-mails, and other 
trusted mechanisms should be utilized to authenticate celebrities, authorities, public figures, and 
organizations’ representatives. Finally, since we focused on the source’s characteristics within the 
Facebook environment in this study, future research could focus on expanding the findings by utilizing 
more samples that are representative of various SNSs. Future research could also focus on investigating 
message characteristics and their impacts on SNSs users’ susceptibility to social engineering 
victimization.  
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